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Abstract—The 2016 United States presidential election has
been characterized as a period of extreme divisiveness that was
exacerbated on social media by the influence of fake news, trolls,
and social bots. However, the extent to which the public became
more polarized in response to these influences over the course
of the election is not well understood. In this paper we propose
IdeoTrace, a framework for (i) jointly estimating the ideology of
social media users and news websites and (ii) tracing changes
in user ideology over time. We apply this framework to the last
two months of the election period for a group of 47508 Twitter
users and demonstrate that both liberal and conservative users
became more polarized over time.
I. INTRODUCTION
Contrary to President Obama’s famous declaration that,
“There is not a liberal America and a conservative America—
there is the United States of America”, growing evidence
points to the large divisions between liberal and conservative
Americans. In addition to a widening gap on political issues
[1], liberal and conservative Americans have become more
segregated in terms of geographic location [2], and cultural
and lifestyle preferences [3]. There have even been differences
found in brain structure [4] and basic biological responses [5]
between liberals and conservatives.
While social media reflects the current divisiveness through
the homophily exhibited in online social networks, [6], [7],
there may also be factors unique to social media which are
actually exacerbating polarization. For example, a recent study
found that the percentage of opinion pieces versus descriptive
news in users’ news consumption is larger when accessing
articles through social media instead of directly visiting news
websites [8]. This shift in media diet may be driving social
media users further to the left or right as opinion pieces
have been shown to increase readers’ political bias [9]. In
addition, social media has become a platform and an amplifier
for malicious online actors, including bots and trolls, who
are intent on increasing polarization and manipulating users.
Several studies have demonstrated the success of bots in
moving users with initially moderate views to more extremist
positions [10]–[14]. It has also been shown that trolls have
embedded themselves within social networks on both sides
of controversial issues with the intent of amplifying conflict,
including in the #BlackLivesMatter movement [15] and the
vaccination debate [16].
The effect of social media on public opinion came to inter-
national attention during the 2016 United States presidential
election, when it was determined that Russian trolls operating
through the organization called the Internet Research Agency
(IRA) posed as American voters on online platforms including
Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter, with the intent of sowing
divisiveness in the election [17]. Recent studies have examined
troubling aspects of social media during the 2016 election,
including the activity and social connectivity of Russian trolls
[18], [19] and the propagation of fake news [20], [21].
However, to date there has been limited analysis on whether
the polarization between liberals and conservatives actually
increased over the election period, potentially in response
to these malicious attacks. Given that much of the focus of
Russian trolls was on propagating fake news and directing
users towards extremist websites, we are particularly interested
in measuring polarization based on news media consumption
in order to understand whether liberal and conservative users
were becoming more driven apart into information filter bub-
bles.
The focus of this work is therefore on the development of
a framework to jointly estimate the ideology of social media
users and the news sources they interact with online, and to
trace the evolution of user ideology over time. Using this
framework, we analyze Twitter activity over the final months
of the 2016 election in order to detect trends in the polarization
of users over time and trace the shift in individual social media
users.
A. Contributions
In this paper, we propose IdeoTrace, a framework to jointly
estimate the political ideology of news websites and social
media users, and to trace the ideology of social media users
over time. This approach uses a matrix factorization method
to model political ideology without requiring labelled data,
allowing this work to be extended to large-scale datasets.
IdeoTrace also leverages the network between users to improve
model estimates by imposing that socially connected users
share similar ideology.
After applying the IdeoTrace framework to Twitter posts
(tweets) related to the election that were published between
September 1 and Election Day, November 8, 2016, we demon-
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strate that the liberal and conservative clusters of users became
more polarized over time. We do so by showing that the
average distance between the liberal and conservative clusters
increased over time.
In this paper, the term users will be used to refer to social
media users, and the term websites will be used to refer
specifically to websites generating written content on political
topics. The terms political ideology and bias will also be used
interchangeably to refer to a given user’s orientation towards
political issues. We will use standard terminology from U.S.
politics and refer to the two political ideology groups as
liberals, or the left, and conservatives, or the right.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
Previous work in social analysis has either focused on
modelling opinion dynamics in a social network over time
or on estimating the ideology of news sources and social
media users at a single time point. We detail prior work on
both of these problems that we drew upon in formulating the
IdeoTrace model.
A. Ideology Estimation
There is a large body of work in social media analysis
that ignores the temporal aspects of ideology, and instead
uses statistical models to infer the political ideology of social
media users and/or news websites based on features such as
users’ follow networks and the language in social media posts
and news articles. We refer to this body of work as ideology
estimation.
Recent works on estimating the political ideology of social
media users include [22] and [23] which infer users’ ideology
based on the text in their social media posts using an recurrent
neural network framework and natural language processing
techniques respectively. In [24], political ideology is inferred
by jointly estimating the ideology of Twitter users and the
politicians that they follow using a Bayes ideal-point estima-
tion model.
Other studies have focused on inferring the political ideol-
ogy of news websites. This includes [25], where the authors
designed a support vector machine to classify the political
ideology and factuality of websites using input features such as
article popularity, web traffic, sentiment scores, and linguistic
expressions of the article text. Another popular approach to
this problem is the use of matrix factorization. In [26], the
authors create a bipartite graph representing the sections from
the entire corpus of President Obama’s official speeches which
were quoted by various news sources. The authors used a ma-
trix completion algorithm to learn the latent features capturing
which news sources are likely to quote certain sections of
President Obama’s speeches. The first two features of this
latent space were found to roughly correspond to political
ideology (liberal/conservative) and the type of news source
(mainstream/independent).
More recent papers have also focused on jointly estimat-
ing user ideology and news source ideology using matrix
factorization. In [27], the authors developed a shared matrix
factorization model that trained on a dataset with article text
labeled as factual or fake news in order to jointly estimate the
latent features of social media users, article text, and news
sources. The model is used to detect which news sources
are more likely to produce fake news and estimate users’
individual susceptibility to spreading fake news. Using an ap-
proach most similar to that detailed in this paper for ideology
estimation, Lahoti et al. [28] used a matrix factorization model
to jointly estimate user and news source ideology for Twitter
users, with an additional penalty enforcing smoothness over
the retweet network. IdeoTrace is an extension of this work
that, in addition to jointly estimating website and user ideology
using unlabeled data, also considers user ideology at each
point on time.
B. Opinion Dynamics Models
There is also a large body of work around opinion dynamics,
which aims to trace the evolution of users’ opinions over time.
Note that while this paper is primarily concerned with the
estimation of users’ political ideology, the term opinion is
a generalization of the concept of political ideology, and is
defined as an individual’s “cognitive orientation towards an
object”, such as an event, topic, or another individual, and
can be represented using a real-valued scalar or vector [29].
Opinion dynamics models typically either ignore influences
on ideology external to the social network between users,
or treat these influences as known inputs. The early, well-
established work on this problem centered around the devel-
opment of theoretical models that, given a social network of
users with an initial distribution of opinions, use rule-based
updates often inspired by physical or biological networks to
estimate user opinion over multiple time steps. The models are
then shown in simulation to converge to particular distributions
based on the network and update rules. For example, in [30]
it was shown that modelling confirmation bias by moving
users with similar opinions closer together each simulation
step and breaking the network link between them otherwise,
often results in the formation of a bimodal opinion distribution.
For a review of popular opinion dynamics models, we refer
to [29].
While the theoretical work in opinion dynamics has been
important for understanding the type of update rules and
network structures which lead to consensus or bimodal opinion
distribution, the emergence of social media has shifted the
focus of recent papers from theoretical work to using obser-
vational data to trace user ideology.
In one of the first works to trace long-term political ideol-
ogy, Garimella et al. [31] measured the polarization of Twitter
users over an eight year period. The authors labeled the
accounts of prominent politicians as liberal or conservative,
and users were obtained for the study by selecting among
the followers of these politicians. Polarity was measured by
modelling the likelihood at each point in time of a user
retweeting liberal versus conservative accounts. In a separate
experiment, they also measured polarization based on the
differences in hashtag usage between liberal and conservative
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users. Through both measures they authors demonstrated an
increase in polarization over the eight year period by 10-20%
[31].
A recent paper, [32], also examined temporal trends over
the 2016 election period, and showed that the activity levels
of Twitter users provides a reasonable estimate of candidate
favorability in opinion polls. The authors determined that
the co-occurrence network of hashtags included in election-
related tweets was composed of two clusters, one consisting
of hashtags that were pro-Clinton or anti-Trump, and the other
of hashtags that were pro-Trump or anti-Clinton. The paper
used a classifier to categorize users as pro-Clinton or pro-
Trump using these labeled hashtags, and demonstrated that the
percentage of users favoring either candidate closely tracked
with New York Times opinion polls for Clinton and Trump
respectively over the five month period leading to the election.
III. APPROACH
In this section, we develop IdeoTrace, a model that uses
matrix factorization techniques to jointly estimate (i) the ide-
ology of websites (constant over time) and (ii) the evolution of
user ideology over time based on users’ social media activity.
A. Assumptions
We first detail the assumptions governing the online be-
havior of social media users that we utilize in the design of
IdeoTrace.
(A1) Each website has an overall bias or ideology that affects
the viewpoints expressed in its published content, and
similarly each user has an underlying bias or ideology
that affects her online behavior. We can view a website’s
ideology as a summation of the political ideology ex-
pressed over all articles produced by the organization. The
existence of an underlying news website ideology that
affects the organization’s overall behavior is supported
by studies which were able to determine news source
ideology based on factors such as selection bias and
linguistic features of article text [26], [27], [33]. The
existence of user bias is also well supported by studies
finding evidence of confirmation bias in users’ news
consumption via social media [34]. This assumption is
clearly necessary for our approach of modelling political
ideology as the latent variable affecting user behavior on
social media.
(A2) Users generally share articles that reflect their political
viewpoint. While the dataset used in this experiment
includes cases where users linked an article along with a
comment in the post indicating they found the viewpoints
in the article to be absurd, in general these instances
appeared to be less common. This assumption is further
supported by studies such as [35] which found a strong
correlation between the average ideology expressed in
Twitter users’ media consumption to the average ideology
of articles shared by users. This assumption allows us to
model the likelihood of a website being shared by a par-
ticular user as an inner product between the representation
of the user’s ideology and the website’s ideology.
(A3) Users form social networks with other users who reflect
their viewpoint. This is an example of homophily, the
tendency of individuals to connect with others who hold
similar opinions to their own; its presence in social
networks has been well documented [6], [36], [37]. Based
on this assumption we can enforce in our model that the
estimated ideologies for users should be smooth over their
social network.
(A4) The ideology of news websites does not vary over the
election period. Although there are studies that have
found evidence of a drift in media ideology, e.g. [38], we
can expect that a media organization, which is comprised
of multiple journalists, will be slower to shift in overall
ideology in comparison to a single user. This assumption
allows us to treat the website ideology as fixed in the
IdeoTrace framework and track changes in user ideology
over time.
B. Model of Social Media Behavior
We consider a set of N social media users posting tweets
with links to articles produced by a set of M news websites
(e.g. nytimes.com, cnn.com, breitbart.com). Using Assumption
A1 we represent the political ideology of both users and
websites as vectors that lie in a K-dimensional space. Based
on Assumption A2, it follows that if the vector representation
of a given user’s political ideology is closely aligned with
the vector representation of a website’s ideology, the user is
more likely to share an article produced by the website. The
proposed statistical model therefore treats the probability that
a user shares an article on social media at a particular time
as a function of (i) the inner product between the current
ideology of the user and the ideology of the news source, (ii)
the popularity of the news source, and (iii) the user’s activity
level on social media.
We formulate the problem as follows. We are given a binary
matrix Y ∈ {0, 1}M×N where entry yij = 1 indicates that
user j shared an article produced by website i, and yij = 0
otherwise. Let the matrix C ∈ RN×K be composed of
row vectors cj ∈ RK that represent each user j’s political
ideology. Similarly, we let the matrix W ∈ RM×K , which
is composed of row vectors wi ∈ RK , denote the political
ideology of each website i. The vector µ ∈ RM captures the
overall popularity of every website, and the vector ν ∈ RN
captures the overall activity level of each user. Treating each
entry yij as a Bernoulli random variable, we can then write the
probability that user j shares an article produced by website
i as follows:
zi,j = Φ(wic
T
j + µi + νj) ∀i, j (1)
yi,j ∼ Ber(zi,j) (2)
In (1), Φ(·) is an inverse link function that maps the inner
product between wi and cj , which represents the alignment
in ideology between the user j and the website i, to the success
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probability of a Bernoulli random variable yi,j ∈ {0, 1}. For
ease of computation, the link function used is the inverse logit
function, which is defined as Φ(x) = 11+exp(−x) . Note that in
this expression µi is a single entry from µ which captures the
bias of a single website i, and similarly νj is a single entry
from ν capturing the bias of a single user.
As a result of elements of W and C being able to take on
both positive and negative values, if a particular set of vectors
cj and wi have the same sign in each dimension, the user is
more likely to share an article from that website. This results
in the sign of each dimension corresponding to two sides of
the political ideology spectrum.
C. Tracing User Ideology
We now extend the model described in Section III-B to
consider the case where user ideology changes over time.
Let T denote the total number of time steps. In this new
framework, at each time point t, we are given a binary matrix
Y t ∈ {0, 1}M×N that represents the aggregate set of websites
shared by each user since the previous time step. We treat the
ideology of websites, W as fixed based on Assumption A4.
We then model the ideology of all users at time t as the matrix
Ct. To account for the differences in user activity and website
popularity over time, we treat the website bias vector, µ, and
the user bias vector, ν, as time-varying as well.
D. Joint Estimation of User and Website Ideology
Given the framework described in Sections III-B and III-C,
we now describe the methodology used to estimate the set
of user ideology matrices {Ct}Tt=0 and the website ideology
W given the set of observation matrices {Yt}Tt=0. Recall
that {Yt}Tt=0 is the set of binary matrices that represent
which websites each user shared at each time point. We use
the following loss function that minimizes the negative log
likelihood of the observed data:
min
{Ct,µt,νt},W
T∑
t=0
(∑
i,j
− logBti,jp
(
yti,j |wi, ctj , µti, νti
))
+
γ
2
||W ||2F +
γ
2
T∑
t=0
||C||2F
+
T∑
t=0
(
λtr
(
(Ct)TLRCt
)
+ τ ||Ct − Ct−1||2F
)
.
(3)
In this expression, p(yti,j |wi, ctj , µti, νti ) is derived based on
(1) and (2), and can be written as Φ(2(yti,j − 1)(wi(cj)T +
µti + ν
t
j)). The matrix B
t is a weighting function which is
used to assign a larger cost in the loss function to the set of
websites that users shared (entries where yti,j = 1) over the set
of websites users did not share (entries where yti,j = 0). The
term tr refers to the trace of the matrix and LR represents the
Laplacian of the user social network and is used to enforce
the assumption of homophily over the social network (see
Assumption A3); this is expanded upon below.
The matrix Bt ∈ RM×N is used to differentiate the loss
function between positive and negative labels. Social media
datasets are an example of implicit data, where only positive
labeled entries are observed, and we are unable to differentiate
between negative and unlabeled data. In other words, the fact
that a user did not share an article from a particular website
could either indicate that the user disagreed with the content
of the article, or that the user agrees with the website ideology
but was unaware of the website or did not come across articles
they wished to share produced by the website. Following the
approach outlined in [39] and [40], we adjust for the higher
uncertainty associated with negative labels by setting Bti,j = 1
for entries where yti,j = 0, and setting B
t
i,j = β for entries
where yti,j = 1, where β > 1 is a constant determined through
parameter tuning.
The expression tr((Ct)TLRCt), which we refer to as the
graph penalty, then enforces the estimate of Ct should be
smooth over the social network graph, meaning that if user
j is influenced by user k, then the estimate for ctj should be
close to the estimate for ctk. We assume that the relationship
between users can be captured by a social network which
we represent using an undirected, unweighted graph, where
users correspond to nodes in the graph and an edge between
user j and user k indicates that at least one of the users is
influenced by the behavior of the other. The Laplacian matrix
LR ∈ RN×N is defined as the difference between the degree
matrix, a diagonal matrix where each entry Dj,j is the edge
degree of user j, and the adjacency matrix, which is a binary
matrix where entry Aj,k = 1 if an edge exists between users j
and k and Aj,k = 0 otherwise. The graph penalty, also referred
to as the Laplacian quadratic form, is known to be equal to
the sum of differences in cj and ck between all pairs of users
j and k that are connected in the graph [41].
As is normal in ridge regression, the L2 penalties, ||Ct||2F
and ||W ||2F , are used to induce interpretability in the results
by constraining the magnitude of the estimates of {Ct} and
W . Finally to ensure smoothness over adjacent time points we
also impose a loss penalty using the squared Frobenius norm
on the difference in magnitude between adjacent Ct matrices.
Given that the loss function (3) is nonconvex, the estimates
for the parameters were determined by finding a local minima.
Point estimates for W , {Ct}, {µt}, and {νt} were deter-
mined using the Adam stochastic gradient descent method as
implemented in TensorFlow [42]. The values for β and the
regularization parameters γ, τ and λ were determined using
cross validation.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
We now demonstrate the performance of IdeoTrace on
a real-world social media dataset. Given that the data is
primarily clustered into a set of liberal users and websites and
a set of conservative users and websites, we found in practice
that setting the latent ideology dimension to K = 2 yielded
results that were most interpretable.
We ran three sets of experiments:
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• In Section IV-C, we compare the model estimates against
the set of ground truth labels for the ideology of users
and websites.
• In Section IV-D, we measure the performance of the
model in predicting the posting behavior of a new set
of Twitter users using the estimates for W and {µt}
computed from training.
• In Section IV-E, we determine whether users became
more polarized over time based on the model estimates
of user ideology.
A. Dataset and Processing
The dataset used for this experiment is a publicly available
collection of tweets that were posted between July 13, 2016
and November 8, 2016 [43]. The dataset was originally gath-
ered by Littman et al. using Twitter’s Streaming API to filter
out tweets that included terms related to the election such as
“election2016”, “election”, “clinton”, “kaine”, “trump”, and
“pence” in the Tweet text, as well as terms related to specific
election events such as the three debates. In compliance with
Twitter’s developer policy, the dataset contains only the ID
numbers for the Tweets. The complete Twitter dataset was
collected through Twitter’s Rest API using a software package
called Hydrator1. Due to Twitter’s restrictions, any deleted
messages or messages posted by accounts that were deleted
prior to the date the data was downloaded, which began in
September 2018, were not included in the dataset. As a result
the dataset likely does not include tweets from accounts that
were flagged as being Russian trolls and many bot accounts
which were deleted immediately after the election.
To reduce the set of websites to English-based news sources,
only tweets that were written in English were included.
From this reduced set of tweets, we constructed the set of
observation matrices {Y t}Tt=0 and the Laplacian of the retweet
network, LR. To ensure that we have have at least one
observation per time point, we defined a time point as a two
week period from September to November of 2016, and select
a set of 47508 users who shared at least four articles in each
time period from a set of 258 websites. The full set of websites
posted by these this particular set of users is larger, but the
set was narrowed to the most popular websites to ensure that
there was a sufficient number of observations per website.
To construct {Y t}Tt=0, we consider the set of tweets con-
taining a URL link. Note that because a large portion of
the URLs were shortened links that redirect through link
shortening service such as bit.ly or ow.ly, the Python requests
library was used to extract the original domain name. To
ensure that the URL link was to a news article, we filtered
out websites that typically link to videos, forum discussions,
blog posts, and other unrelated sites such as wordpress.com,
youtube.com, reddit.com, wordpress.com, vimeo.com, insta-
gram.com, facebook.com, and amazon.com. To construct Y t,
we then aggregate the set of URL domains that each user
1https://github.com/DocNow/hydrator
shared links to over the time period t and form the results
into a binary matrix.
On Twitter, the social network of users is typically repre-
sented by users’ follow networks, or by the retweet network.
Note that retweet is a term used on Twitter for when a user
posts the content produced by another user without altering
the original content. We can therefore in general consider a
retweet as an indication that the user agrees with the content
posted by the other user, and therefore most likely the pair of
users have similar political ideologies. Based on the results of
[28], where it was determined in performing joint estimation
of user and website ideology that use of the retweet networks
resulted in improved performance over use of the follower
network, in this paper we also used the retweet network to
represent how users influence each other. The retweet graph
that is constructed based on this network is an undirected graph
where nodes represent users, and where an edge between user
j and user k indicates that user j has posted at least one
retweet from user k or vice versa over the entire time period.
B. Ground Truth Labels
We require a set of ground truth labels of user and website
ideology to quantify the performance of the ideology estimates
produced by IdeoTrace. Given that we do not have additional
information on the self-identified bias of websites as well as
Twitter users, we rely on other sources including expert labels
to determine the ground truth ideology values.
1) Website Labels: For news websites, we use the set
of labels on website ideology produced by the organization
Media Bias\Fact Check 2, which has served as a resource for
expert labels on website ideology for related previous work
including [19], [25]. The organization evaluates media sources
based on a combination of qualitative and quantitative factors
such as biased wording, factuality, story choices, and political
affiliation to categorize the website’s overall political ideology
as extreme right, right, right-center, center, left-center, left, or
extreme left.
2) User Labels: Given that Twitter users are anonymous,
we do not have access to additional information to determine
their political ideology. We instead used the same approach
outlined in [28] where we treat the average ideology of the set
of websites shared by each user, as measured by the estimate of
W , as the ground truth ideology. To obtain a scalar estimate of
the ground truth, we first project W using principle component
analysis (PCA) onto a single dimension and then compute the
average ideology per user.
C. Evaluation of User and Website Ideology Estimates
To improve computation speed we split the users into
eight sets of approximately 5938 users and ran the IdeoTrace
framework separately on each set.
We evaluate the accuracy and interpretability of the ideology
estimates produced by IdeoTrace by comparing the estimates
of W and {Ct} for each set of users against the ground truth
2wwww.mediabiasfactcheck.com
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Fig. 1. A visualization of the rows of W , which represent the estimated
political ideology of each website. The axes in the image correspond to the
two latent features representing political ideology. Each website is shaded
based on the ground truth label. The figure shows a clear separation between
conservative and liberal websites. Examples of well-known news sources such
as The New York Times and Fox News are highlighted with stars.
ideology labels using both visual examination and by com-
puting the correlation coefficient between the model estimates
and ground truth.
To evaluate the website ideology W , we first plot the model
estimate for {wi}Mi=1, the ideology of individual websites, as
shown in Figure 1. The results shown in this image are the
IdeoTrace estimate of W after training on a single set of 5938
users. The figure displays 136 of the 258 websites included in
the dataset for which there exist ground truth labels provided
by Media Bias/Fact Check. Given that K = 2, the ideology of
each website exists in a 2-dimensional space so we can directly
visualize the results. The coloring of each website indicates
the ground truth label. It is visually clear from the figure that
IdeoTrace learns a separation between conservative and liberal
websites, and also learns to separate extremely biased websites
from slightly biased websites.
Using the Spearman rank correlation [44], we found that
the correlation between ground truth and the estimate website
ideology, averaging over the eight sets of users, is 0.87 ± 0.04.
This indicates that the estimated ideologies align fairly well
with the ground truth labels. The Spearman correlation was
used in particular as this metric determines the strength of
the monotonic relationship between the estimated ideology,
which lies on a continuous interval, and the ground truth
labels, which is an ordinal set, based on the rank ordering
of the data. Values of the coefficient close to 1 indicate a
monotonically increasing relationship between ground truth
labels and the model estimates, and values close to -1 indicate
a monotonically decreasing relationship.
We also evaluate the accuracy and interpretability of the
model’s ideology estimate for each user, {ctj}Nj=1. In Figure
Fig. 2. A visualization of the columns of Ct, which represent the political
ideology of each user, at each time step t. Each user is shaded based on the
ground truth label.
2, we visualize the estimated ideology of each user from one
user set as represented in the rows of Ct at each time point
t. Each data point in the figure is colored according to the
associated user’s ground truth ideology at that point in time.
It is again visually clear from the figure that for all time points
the liberal users and the conservative users form two distinct
clusters, with few users positioned in between both clusters.
We also measured the linear relationship between the es-
timated user ideology value and the ground truth estimate.
For this analysis we used the Pearson correlation coefficient,
as both the estimated user ideology and ground truth labels
lie in continuous intervals. The Pearson correlation coefficient
between the estimated user ideology and the ground truth label
averaged over all time points and over all sets of users was
0.97 ± 0.01, further demonstrating that the estimated values
are highly correlated with the ground truth.
This analysis demonstrates that the latent factor in the model
corresponds to political bias, and that the estimates produced
by IdeoTrace for website and user ideology match ground truth
labels. This analysis also confirms that the political bias of the
readers of a website serve as a reasonable measurement of the
political bias of the website, a finding which has also been
supported in a previous study [45].
D. Predicting the Ideology of Unobserved Users
We validate the model against a set of social media users
unobserved by the model in training. Using the model esti-
mates produced by training on one of the eight sets of users,
we predict user behavior on a second set. This process is
repeated for four unique pairs of training and testing sets of
users and the results are averaged over all pairs. Note that
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Model F1
IdeoTrace 0.41± 0.05
Rasch 0.27 ± 0.07
Static MF 0.33 ± 0.05
TABLE I
COMPARISON OF THE F1 MEAN AND STANDARD DEVIATION ON
PREDICTING THE BEHAVIOR OF UNOBSERVED USERS.
because IdeoTrace relies in part on the social network to
measure ideology, we use the same number of users in both
the training and validation set.
For each time step tpred > 0 we fix the values of W and
{µt}Tt=0 which were determined in training, and run the model
on t < tpred to estimate the values of C
tpred
val and ν
tpred
val . For time
t = 0 we estimate Ctpredval and ν
tpred
val by setting the estimate for
all users to the average of the training estimates, C0 and ν0.
We evaluate prediction performance using the F1 score against
two baselines.
The first baseline is based on the Rasch model [46], which
models p(yi,j = 1) = Φ(α(µi − νj). The Rasch model was
formulated based on item response theory and is a popular
model for applications such as predicting student performance
on academic tests. In the Rasch model, each website i and
each user j is represented using a single parameter, µi and
νj respectively. The second baseline is a static version of
IdeoTrace which does not use the retweet network and assumes
that the user ideology matrix, C, is constant over time.
The results are shown in Table IV-D, which shows that
IdeoTrace outperforms both baselines.
E. Tracing User Ideology
We now examine the evolution of user ideology over time
for both the liberal and conservative groups of users to
determine whether these two groups became more polarized.
In particular, we examine whether the centers of the liberal and
conservative clusters moved further apart over time. Although
the time period over which we are examining user ideology,
from September 1 to November 8, 2016, is fairly brief, we
were still able to detect trends in user behavior. We ran the
analysis separately on each set of users and average the results
to determine the overall increase in polarization.
We first cluster the users into the liberal and conservative
groups by running a K-means algorithm on the estimates of
C at time 0. Using this labeling approach, on average 48%
of each set consists of conservative users, and 52% consists
of liberal users. We then compute the distance between the
average value of Ct within the liberal cluster and the average
value of Ct within the conservative cluster for each time point
t. In Figure 3a we plot the percentage increase in the distance
between the two cluster means relative to time t = 0. From
the figure, we can see a steady increase of up to 3.43 ± 0.14%
in polarization from September 1 to Election Day.
We then examine the ideological shifts in the liberal and
conservative groups. Using PCA, we project the estimates
of {cj}Nj=1 onto a single dimension where one direction of
the axis is associated with liberalism and the other direction
(a) Distance between clusters (b) Shift towards extremism
Fig. 3. The (a) percentage increase in distance between liberal and conserva-
tives clusters and the (b) percentage increase towards extremism of liberal and
conservative clusters over the course of the election as measured by IdeoTrace.
is associated with conservatism. After computing the scalar
cluster mean values, we plot the percentage increase towards
extremism of both groups as shown in Figure 3b. We can
see an overall shift in the liberal cluster towards becoming
more liberal by 3.43% and an overall shift in the conservative
cluster towards becoming more conservative by 2.70%. Using
the dependent t-test, the p-values for these results were found
to be < 0.001 for both the liberal and conservative clusters.
V. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we presented the IdeoTrace algorithm, which
uses matrix factorization to jointly estimate the latent political
ideology of both social media users and websites, and also
trace the change in political ideology of users over time.
We analyzed the performance of the algorithm on a set of
Twitter users who shared news articles during the 2016 U.S.
presidential election.
We demonstrated that the estimates produced by IdeoTrace
for news website ideology closely align with the expert-
produced ideology labels, and the estimates for Twitter users
also appear reasonable based on the set of websites each
user shared. Our observation that Twitter users formed tightly
clustered news media bubbles, where users primarily shared
articles from either the space of conservative news outlets
or the space of liberal news outlets, supports the results of
previous papers including the work by Lahoti et al. [28]. A
second key finding from this paper is that the liberal and
conservative clusters became more polarized over time by
moving further apart in the ideological space. This claim is
also supported by the prior study by Garimella et al. [31],
which also found, using a different metric and approach from
that detailed in this paper, an increase in polarization between
liberal and conservative users over the 2016 election.
Increasing polarization should be an issue of public concern.
Recent studies have demonstrated correlation or even direct
causation between Twitter activity and the rise of extremist
7
and violent movements. Detection of polarized behavior on
social media directly preceded violent protests in numerous
societies including Baltimore [47], Egypt [48], and Venezuela
[49]. More troubling, there have been multiple events where
fake news posts directly triggered mob rage and violence
against minority groups in countries such as Bangladesh [50]
and Myanmar [51].
In response to the growing threats of polarization, extrem-
ism, and fake news, researchers are proposing new meth-
ods of intervention by, for example, increasing exposure to
diverse opinions on social media [52], [53] and using bots
to intervene when racist language is detected [54]. Under
pressure from governments and social media users, platforms
such as Facebook and Twitter are also proposing changes to
their system such as adding content moderators and automated
algorithms to flag suspicious accounts and content. However,
it is unclear at present whether these interventions are actu-
ally effective, or whether these interventions are effectively
targeting individuals who are most at risk for becoming more
extremist. Therefore one important potential application of the
IdeoTrace framework could be to serve as a scalable tool
for tracing changes in user ideology and enable researchers
to quantitatively evaluate the success of these large-scale
interventions in combating the negative effects of social media.
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